After the Kophinou (Geçitkale) and Ayinos Theodoros (Boğaziçi) at­tack of the Greek Cypriot army, which created a serious and deep crisis between Turkey and Greece, The junta in Greece responded positively to the UN call to withdraw the Greek troops on the island. The Greek junta, to lower the heat and the tension between Turkey and itself, made a proposal to exchange the island of Castellorizon (Meis) for the union of Cyprus with Greece and other concessions. The Turkish government flatly rejected these offers.

The Greek government was no longer impressed by Archbishop Makarios’ judgment, nor with his strategy toward enosis. He had led them to attack the Turks and face war with Turkey. Beyond his expectations, the Turkish Cyp­riots had stood firm despite the heavy blows he thought would be enough to drive them from the island.

The Greek junta refused to pursue Makarios’ strategy of keeping the Greek army on the Cyprus to prevent the possible intervention of Turkey. They decided to withdraw, as officially requested by the UN, leaving behind a gaping and disillusioned Makarios.

Turkey’s action following the 1967 crisis and the undertaking by Greece to withdraw her forces from Cyprus paved the way for the commencement of inter-communal talks to find a just and peaceful settlement to the Cyprus problem.

Until then the Greek Cypriot side had adamantly refused to enter into negotiations with the Turkish Cypriots, whom they called “rebels”.

The talks commenced in June 1968, initially in the Beirut, continuing later in the Ledra Palace Hotel in Nicosia. They continued until September 1971, when they stalled.

It should be noted that it was in 1971 that Georgios Grivas, who had left the island in accordance with Turkey’s ultimatum in 1967, returned secretly to Cyprus to stir up trouble again.

After considerable prodding by the UN the talks resumed again in June 1972. At the inaugural meeting on June 8, 1972, the Turkish Cypriot negotiator, Rauf R. Denktaş, made the following statement:

“The area in which Cyprus is located is highly sensitive. The inseparable ties of the two communities with their respective motherlands are too strong to be denied. The fact that whatever happens between the two communities is inevitably reflected in Ankara and Athens cannot be disregarded. We therefore, as the two national communities in Cyprus, the co-founders of the independence and sovereignty of Cyprus and partners in the administrative set-up of the Cyprus State have a duty not only to our respective communities and to Cyprus as a whole but we also have an international duty for maintaining the peace in this delicate area in the knowledge that, by doing so, we help our respective motherlands to normalize their political relations. Cyprus should be and can be made a bridge of Greco-Turkish friendship and cooperation. Our role to this end can be most significant.”

Regrettably, the Turkish Cypriot side’s spirit of cooperation and compromise found no echo on the Greek Cypriot side.

In this context, it should be noted that Glafkos Klerides, the Greek Cypriot negotiator, stated in the Cyprus Mail newspaper on Aug. 8, 1976, that a “near agreement” had been reached during the inter-communal talks in 1971 and 1972, which the Greek Cypriot Council of Mi­nisters and Makarios vetoed.

Between 1971 and 1974 period, Makarios continued to make provocative speeches in various parts of the island.

Addressing a public gathering at Yenierenköy (Yialousa), a village situated on the north shores of the Karpaz peninsula on March 14, 1971 Makarios was recorded as saying: “Cyprus is Greek. Cyprus was Greek since the dawn of its history, and will remain Greek. Greek and undivided we have taken it over. Greek and undivided we shall preserve it. Greek and undivided we shall deliver it to Greece.”

Makarios, realizing the impossibility of enosis by brute force under the existing conditions, decided to wait and enjoy the benefits of his role in “the only recognized official government of Cyprus” until the day when Turkey would be weak and unable to intervene. Then he would be able to have the Turkish Cypriots squeezed into ghettos on 3 percent of the island with no money, no jobs, no food, no electricity, no water and no hope.

During the same period, ter­rorist activities of EOKA-B, born from the ashes of the notorious National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA), the ensu­ing political tensions and the tactical differences between Makarios and the Greek military junta started to adversely affect the already overburdened atmosphere on the island in general, and the inter-communal talks in particular.